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Australia's Environmental Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: risk 
and uncertainty, science and precaution 
Fern Wickson 
University of Wollongong 
Introduction 
The advance of recombinant DNA technology (popularly known as 'genetic engineering' or 
'genetic modification') has seen an intense social debate develop around the potential 
hazards this technology may pose for human health and the environment. Originally, 
concerns about the potential environmental impact of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) focussed on the possibility that these organisms may escape from laboratories, 
survive and have a negative environmental impact (Wright 1994, 136-159). Approvals are, 
however, now being routinely sought for the deliberate environmental release of GMOs for 
commercial production and this has lead to increased pressure on governments to regulate 
the release of these organisms in a way that is capable of minimising negative impacts on 
social and biological environments. The governance problem of controlling the environmental 
impact of GMOs, and how this problem has been approached in the Australian context, form 
the central concerns of this paper. 
In 2001, Australia implemented a new regulatory system for gene technologies through 
its enactment of the Gene Technology Act 2000. The objective of this legislation is stated as 
being: 
to protect the health and safety of people, and to protect the environment, by identifying 
risks posed by or as a result of gene technology, and by managing those risks through 
regulating certain dealings with GMOs (Commonwealth of Australia 2000, 1). 
The agency established for the regulation of gene technologies in Australia, the Office of 
the Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR) has therefore been charged with the objective of 
'protecting the environment' by 'identifying and managing risks' posed by GMOs. One of the 
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key problems associated with this objective is that while the environment has undoubtedly 
become an important social and political concern in modern industrial societies (Eder 1996, 
163-5; Szerszynski et al. 1996, 19), the nature of 'the environment' and what it means to 
'protect it' remain fiercely contested. Most notably, there is a paradigmatic divide between 
those viewing the environment instrumentally as primarily a human resource that can be 
protected through the appropriate application of economic measures and technological 
advances, and those who view organisms and natural systems as having some degree of 
inherent value that can only be protected through altered social structures and beliefs. This 
can be described as a divide between shallow and deep environmental critiques of industrial 
modernity or between reformist and revolutionary (or radical) environmentalism (Doyle and 
Kellow 1995, 66-70; Porritt 1984, 5; Pepper 1996, 7.). 
As concerns for the environmental impact of new technologies have increased in modern 
industrial societies, and in light of the governance challenges associated with this, there has 
been an accompanying increase in demand for tools and methods that can be used in aid of 
decision making. This demand for assistance in environmental decision making has seen the 
development of such processes as life cycle analysis, environmental impact assessment, 
environmental modelling and risk analysis (Harding 1998, 133). For new technological 
developments, the concept of risk has increasingly come to dominate decision making 
processes (Winner 1986, 138) and has been recognised as particularly prominent in public 
policy deliberations relating to the environmental impact of new technological developments 
(Jasanoff 1999, Rosa 2000). As the objective of the Gene Technology Act indicates, Australia 
has adopted this dominant discourse of risk for its approach to making environmental 
regulatory decisions for GMOs. 
The technical definition of risk used in environmental decision making refers to "a 
combination of the probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a defined hazard and the 
magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence" (Harding 1998, 167). The OGTR has 
stated that for their regulatory decision making, "Risk is measured in terms of a combination 
of the likelihood that a hazard gives rise to an undesired outcome and the seriousness of that 
undesired outcome" (Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 2004, 7). In line with these 
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two definitions then, risk is predominantly viewed in policy contexts as equalling the 
probability of a hazard occurring, times the magnitude of its impact. 
As these definitions indicate, the dominant approach to risk taken by state 
organisations is one based around the notion of actual or objective risk (Adams 1995, 10; 
Robins 2002; Stirling 1999). This is an approach that is structured around the belief that risk 
is a real phenomenon that exists "out there" as a property of the technology or system under 
investigation and which can therefore be measured and calculated in an objective manner by 
an appropriate set of experts. This can be referred to as a 'realist' approach to risk and is a 
position on the nature of risk that is particularly prominent in the natural sciences. Through 
examining social science approaches to the notion of risk, however, we find that just like the 
concept of 'the environment', the concept of 'risk' too is contested. Within various disciplines 
of the social sciences, risk is presented as something that does not exist in an objective 
sense, but which is to some degree socially and culturally constructed. Through highlighting 
the limitations of realist approaches to risk, these social science theories represent a serious 
challenge to the appropriateness of employing technical discourses of risk in environmental 
decision making. 
In this paper I begin by exploring some of the diversity in social science approaches 
to the notion of risk. Through this theoretical review, I begin to sketch an emerging theoretical 
shift in environmental decision making away from science based approaches focussed 
primarily on an objective quantification of risk, towards what are beginning to be contrastingly 
described as precaution based approaches, centred on the negotiation of uncertainties. In 
describing this emerging shift, I draw particular attention to the difference between a 
precautionary approach and the application of a precautionary principle in environmental 
decision making and also highlight the different forms of uncertainty involved in making 
environmental decisions about new technologies. 
Having sketched the poles of a spectrum of competing approaches to environmental 
decision making, I then analyse Australia's framework for the environmental regulation of 
GMOs in terms of whether it can be most appropriately classified as a science or precaution 
based approach to decision making. In this paper, I argue that Australia's current framework 
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for the environmental regulation of GMOs represents a largely technocratic approach that 
effectively marginalises the influence of factors highlighted as important for precaution based 
approaches to environmental decision making. In drawing this conclusion, I complete this 
paper by making some recommendations as to how Australia's framework for the 
environmental regulation of GMOs could evolve to more effectively combine scientific 
analysis and a quantification of risk with deliberative processes aimed at negotiating inherent 
uncertainties. 
Social Science Theories of Risk 
In the late 1970s, the persistence of public fears over certain technologies (such as nuclear 
power) that had been assessed by experts as being safe or posing only a small and 
acceptable degree of risk became a source of confusion for regulators and industrialists 
(Slovic 1987). As experts were seen as having performed an objective and rational 
assessment of the risks posed by a particular technology, the conclusion drawn was often 
that the public's fears represented a false perception of risk, an 'irrational' response to the 
technology that arose due to ignorance (Turner 1984; Shrader-Frechette 1998; Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1982, 75). 
To successfully alleviate public concerns over particular technologies, it became 
increasingly important to try and understand exactly why the public perceived risks in the way 
that they did - for example why were the comparatively low risks from nuclear power plants 
an issue of fierce contention and widespread social rejection, while the high risks associated 
with driving a motor vehicle were generally well accepted? What was driving this difference in 
risk perception? This intriguing and politically relevant question opened the way for 
explorations of the social dimensions of risk (Krimsky 1992, 5) and saw a wealth of social 
science studies into public risk perceptions develop across a number of different disciplines, 
including geography, political science, sociology, psychology and anthropology (Slovic 1987; 
Wildavsky and Dake 1998). The following discussion explores two of the important bodies of 
social science theory on risk perception: the psychometric approach that was developed 
within the field of psychology and the sociological and anthropological approach of cultural 
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theory. These two distinct social science theories on risk primarily differ in the sense that one 
body of theory (psychometric) is focussed on individuals while the other (cultural) is directed 
more towards social or group explanations and analysis (Krimsky 1992, 20-21). 
The Psychometric Approach 
The psychometric approach to risk perception represents a body of research that aims to 
illuminate the psychology behind why members of the public may choose to reject some 
risks, that by expert analysis, represent an acceptable level of danger if calculated according 
to the levels of risk that are accepted in other areas of day to day life. The most widely cited 
finding to emerge from psychometric studies is that various factors or characteristics of the 
risk in question (beyond likelihood and magnitude) influence how it is assessed by members 
of the public. The characteristics revealed to be of importance included the degree of 
voluntariness, familiarity, controllability, catastrophic potential, equity and impact on future 
generations (Slovic et al. 1982; Siovic 1987; Siovic 1991). Recent studies using a 
psychometric approach to risk perception have also shown that factors such as gender, race, 
political worldview and trust can also all affect risk judgements (Davidson and Freudenburg 
1996; Peters and Siovic 1996; Siegrist 1998; Siegrist 2000; Siovic 1999). Psychometric 
approaches have suggested that all of these factors play an important role in whether or not 
particular risks are deemed to be acceptable by the public. 
Through highlighting the importance of various characteristics on public risk 
assessments, psychometric research has suggested that while experts tend to assess risks 
solely on a statistical basis in relation to probabilities and mortality rates, the public uses a 
much broader conception of risk (incorporating a consideration of characteristics such as 
familiarity, controllability, voluntariness etc) in their assessment of risks and their 
acceptability. Psychometric approaches to risk have therefore served to highlight how the 
public is capable of sensitivity to non-statistical considerations in their assessments and how 
they tend to perform a more holistic or contextual assessment of the risks posed by a 
particular technology (Slovic et al. 1982; Siovic 1987; Otway 1987). 
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The finding that the public generally employs a broader or more holistic conception of 
risk than that used by experts suggests that there are important factors of technological risk 
that are not currently being captured during formal risk assessments. The ability to 
incorporate these broader elements of risk into decision making processes is seen to be 
dependent on a reconceptualisation of the role for expertise in risk assessments (Otway 
1987), the establishment of a two way path of communication between the public and experts 
(Otway 1987) and the encouragement of increased public participation and deliberative 
decision making processes during the assessment of technological risks and their 
acceptability (Slovic 1998). As long as experts maintain a monopoly on authority in risk 
assessment and communicate with the public only according to a knowledge deficit model, 
the broader and more contextual elements of risk that are deemed important by members of 
the public will continue to remain outside the scope of formal risk assessment processes and 
debates about the risks associated with contested technologies are likely to continue. 
While the psychometric approach to risk perception has made an important and 
influential contribution to social science understandings of risk, it has not escaped criticism. 
One criticism is that the lack of attention the psychometric approach gives to the way socio-
political factors may also shape public assessments is an important limitation of this 
psychological approach to explaining risk perception (Otway and Thomas 1982; Covello and 
Johnson 1987). Wynne (1983) has also emphasised the importance of a socio-political 
dimension to risk perception through his presentation of the idea of a 'social risk', which he 
defines as the potential for a technology to substantially alter social structures or basic moral 
tenets. This proposition indicates a shift away from simply thinking about the characteristics of 
physical risks as influencing public assessments to highlight the additional importance of 
potential socio-political impacts. 
An associated criticism has been that the characteristics or factors identified as being 
important in psychometric approaches are not actually objective or inherent in the technology 
itself, but rather are factors that are themselves influenced by social and historical experience 
(Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, 17). According to this criticism, the 
psychometric approach takes the factors themselves as being static and real and does not 
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place enough emphasis or importance on the way society and culture will influence not only 
the perception of risk but also the perception of the characteristics identified in psychometric 
approaches. Some of these limitations of the psychometric approach to risk perception have 
been countered through the development of sociological and anthropological approaches to 
risk perception, most notably through the development of what is now referred to as the 
cultural theory of risk. 
Cultural Theory 
The basic premise of cultural theories of risk is that perceptions of risk are influenced by 
cultural factors. While this general statement is supported by a range of social science 
theorists on risk, the title of 'cultural theory' has been co-opted by a much smaller group of 
researchers with a far more particular theory on how cultural influences can be 
conceptualised. The key distinguishing feature of the body of social science theory on risk 
that has come to be known as "cultural theory" is the belief that commitment to a particular 
preferred form of social organisation implies common values and will therefore lead to 
common fears. 
While the cultural theory literature contains some variation in the number of different 
social groupings used to understand the influence of social organisation on risk perception 
(Rayner 1992; Renn 1992), the most widely referred to analytical tool for cultural theorists is 
a four fold typology or 'grid/group'. In the first instance, this typology relates to human nature 
and describes four different cultural biases about preferred forms of organising social 
relations. As developed by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, 138) the horizontal axis of group is 
used to describe the boundary that is erected between people and the outside world while 
the vertical axis of grid refers to all other social distinctions and delegations of authority that 
are used to limit how people behave towards one another. More concretely, the horizontal 
axis of group runs from a belief in human nature that is individualistic to a more collective 
approach while the vertical axis can be described as separating human behaviour on the 
basis of prescribed inequality or prescribing equality (Schwarz and Thompson 1990; 
Thompson et al. 1990). 
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Following Adams and Thompson (2002), a description of the four different 
classifications is outlined below. 
• The individualist tag (weak group, weak grid position) classifies those who believe in 
freedom from outside constraints but who may try to exert control over others. 
Individualists support the notion of freedom of opportunity and believe in the free 
market rationale that the selfish behaviour of individuals leads to improvements for 
society as a whole. A good example of the type of person within this individualist 
category would be a venture capitalist. 
• A hierarchist (strong group, strong grid position) is someone who generally belongs 
to groups with binding prescriptions and who is prepared to submit to hierarchical 
social organisation. A good example of a hierarchist would be a soldier. 
• Egalitarians (strong group, weak grid position) have strong group loyalties but unlike 
the hierarchist, do not support externally imposed rules. Equality is an important 
principle for them and group decisions are sought through participation, deliberation 
and cooperation. Members of environmental pressure groups can be seen to be good 
examples of those falling within this category. 
• Fatalists (weak group, strong grid position) are those people within society who 
choose not to belong to organised groups but who, unlike the individualist, believe 
they exercise little control over their own lives. They are resigned to their fate and are 
hence given the title of fatalists. The untouchables of the Indian caste system are 
given as an example of those classifiable as fatalists. 
When applying cultural theory to an understanding of environmental risk perception, it 
is suggested that another fourfold typology can be laid over this one dealing with social 
relations. Schwarz and Thompson (1990) adopted and added to a description from Holling 
(1979 and 1986) to create a second typology that can be used in cultural theory analysis, a 
typology that describes four "myths of nature": nature benign, nature ephemeral, nature 
perverse/tolerant and nature capricious. The differences between these beliefs have been 
usefully represented through the metaphor of how a ball may behave in varying landscapes. 
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In the nature benign category, nature is seen as being "predictable, bountiful, robust, 
stable and forgiving of any insults humankind might inflict upon it" (Adams and Thompson 
2002). The accompanying image is of a ball in a cup and this is to suggest that no matter 
what perturbation is encountered, the ball will always return to rest safely at the bottom of the 
cup. Nature ephemeral is essentially the diametrically opposed view that nature is "fragile, 
precarious and unforgiving" (Adams and Thompson 2002) and is therefore easily threatened 
by human activity. In the image given for this category, the ball rests precariously atop an 
overturned cup and this indicates that the ball's balance can be easily disturbed. The nature 
perverse/tolerant category is essentially a combination of the two myths already described. 
The idea here is that nature is predictable and stable in the face of perturbations, but only 
within certain limits (Adams and Thompson 2002). The representative image is a wave 
diagram with two peaks and a single trough, with the ball resting in the trough. This is used to 
imply that the ball will remain within the trough given only modest disturbance, but any major 
perturbation will send it over the edge. The final myth is nature capricious where nature is 
viewed as being entirely unpredictable and essentially uncontrollable (Adams and Thompson 
2002). The illustrative image here is one of a ball sitting on a straight line to indicate the 
belief that if disturbed, the ball's (nature's) behaviour will not be predictable. 
When this typology of different myths of nature is laid over the typology of human 
behaviour described earlier, the suggestion is that the nature benign view corresponds with 
individualist category, nature ephemeral with egalitarian, nature perverse/tolerant with 
hierarchist and nature capricious with fatalist But what does all this have to do with risk 
perceptions? According to cultural theory, differences in the perception of risk can be 
understood as flowing from the commitment to different forms of social organisation and 
beliefs about nature; therefore, in any debate centred around physical risks, people will be 
found to be arguing from different premises, premises that stem from their commitment to a 
particular cultural bias in relation to social organisation and beliefs about nature. The cultural 
biases and myths of nature given in the typologies are therefore provided as means of 
identifying, explaining and conceptually organising the different perceptions of risk that might 
emerge in technological debates. This position implies that societal concerns about risk and 
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divergent risk perceptions can be explained not by a lack of rationality or by the 
characteristics of the hazard involved, but rather by the disparity in the perceptual filters 
adopted by different social actors. Rather than a rational and an irrational position in relation 
to risk then, a plurality of rationalities begins to emerge in which risk debates are seen to be 
occurring between people operating from different premises. 
In the beginning of this paper I suggested that realist concepts of risk tend to dominate 
policy environments. Through describing the psychometric and culturat theory approaches to 
risk I have highlighted two important bodies of social science theory that challenge the 
adequacy of realist approaches to the notion of risk. While psychometric approaches 
emphasise the importance of individual psychology and cultural theory emphasises the 
importance of group dynamics and social commitments in public risk assessments, both 
approaches can be seen to represent constructivist rather than realist understandings of the 
notion of risk because both social science approaches highlight the importance of social and 
contextual factors for risk evaluations. According to these approaches then, the process of 
risk assessment is not seen to be adequately performed by experts focussing solely on 
calculating issues of likelihood and magnitude either because this process fails to take of 
account the nature of the risks involved (whether they are familiar, controllable, reversible 
etc) and/or because it fails to consider the way in which judgements about risks and their 
acceptability can be differentially framed by competing worldviews and cultural biases. 
According to these approaches then, to use risk analysis as a decision aiding tool 
appropriately, participation by members of the public with diverse views and values is vital. 
The Shift from Risk Analysis to Uncertainty Negotiation 
When a technical discourse of risk is employed in environmental decision making, the focus 
is obviously on quantifying risk, while uncertainty, the flipside of the risk concept, is usually 
only conceptualised as a lack of knowledge. In the literature on risk and uncertainty in 
environmental decision making, however, there are a number of different typologies of 
uncertainty emerging that represent a further challenge to the adequacy of technical risk 
analysis as a decision making tool. 
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While these typologies differ in how they draw boundaries of distinction and define 
what constitutes the different forms of uncertainty relevant to environmental decision making, 
some patterns can be extracted and developed into conceptually useful categories. Firstly, 
there appears to be agreement in the literature that the term risk is specifically relevant to 
situations where both potential outcomes and the probabilities associated with those 
outcomes can be reasonably well characterised (Wynne 1992; Stirling 1999; Stirling and Gee 
2002). Uncertainty is a term that is best applied to those situations where there is some 
agreement about the potential outcomes but the basis for assigning the relevant probabilities 
is not strong (Wynne 1992; Stirling 1999; Stirling and Gee 2002). In this sense, uncertainty is 
a form of incertitude that can conceptually be reduced by further research; it is a situation 
where there is agreement on the potential outcomes but the research on which an 
assignment of probabilities can occur needs further development. These understandings of 
risk and uncertainty are those that have traditionally been employed in risk analyses. 
When attempting to assess the environmental impacts of new technologies and their 
acceptability, particularly technologies such as genetic engineering, new types of incertitude 
arise that are not well addressed by traditional approaches to risk analysis and the notion of 
uncertainty as it has been understood in these approaches. These types of incertitude can 
be titled ambiguity, indeterminacy and ignorance. Ambiguity can be seen as a result of 
contradictory information and/or the existence of divergent framing assumptions and values 
(Klinke and Renn 2002; Stirling and Gee 2002) (e.g. divergent perceptions of environmental 
harm or relevant environmental endpoints). Indeterminacy can be described as the type of 
incertitude that exists because of the intrinsic complexity associated with predicting the 
outcomes (and probabilities) associated with the interactions of various open-ended social 
and natural systems (Wynne 1992), while the term ignorance can perhaps best be used to 
describe our inability to conceptualise, articulate and therefore consider the outcomes and 
causal relationships that lie beyond current frameworks of understanding - i.e. the things we 
don't know we don't know (Wynne 1992). 
This typology of different forms of incertitude enables us to see how a technical 
discourse of risk fails to take account of ambiguity, indeterminacy, ignorance and even 
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uncertainty in some cases (Stirling and Gee 2002; Wynne, 1992). Failure to explicitly and 
transparently handle these forms of incertitude during decision making processes means that 
the psychological and social factors influencing public risk assessments (as described by 
psychometric and cultural theory) remain implicit and hidden. This failure to explicitly handle 
the different forms of incertitude means that technical risk analyses performed on new 
technologies like genetic engineering are likely to remain the subject of ongoing controversy 
and debate as people continue to emphasise different characteristics of the risks in question 
and argue from competing premises in relation to social and biological organisation. 
Recognising the inadequacy of traditional risk assessment processes, particularly when they 
are applied to the environmental impacts of new technologies, is said to represent 'the real 
justification and imperative for adopting newly emerging precautionary approaches' (Stirling 
and Gee 2002). 
Precautionary Decision Making 
The most widely cited definition of a 'precautionary principle' for environmental policy making 
is that adopted in the Rio Declaration of the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), where was presented thusly: "Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as 
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation" 
(UNCED 1992, Principle 15). 
While the precautionary principle can be seen to represent a shift in the basis for 
environmental decision making, the extent to which it enables engagement with the full range 
of types of incertitude described above is debateable. This is because the understanding of 
'scientific uncertainties' that is often adopted in application of the principle is one in which the 
only type of incertitude involved is one conceptually reducible through further research. This 
means that while the principle has developed to provide guidance for what should happen 
under situations of scientific 'uncertainty', it does not necessarily enable or encourage an 
engagement with the important issues and challenges of ignorance, indeterminacy and 
ambiguity. 
11 
Australia's Environmental Regulation of GMOs 
Some of the various criticisms of the formulaic version of the principle include that the 
idea of what counts as a threat, the criteria for judging seriousness or irreversibility, how the 
degree of uncertainty is to be judged and the yardstick for judging what is cost effective are 
all issues for which no objective or single rational answer exists (Stirling 2002, 2-43). This 
means that applying the notion of precaution as a dogmatic principle or rule becomes 
problematic at least and paralysing at worst. While the precautionary principle may therefore 
be seen to represent admirable sentiments for environmental protection, important questions 
remain about how it can be practically applied in political decision making (O'Riordan and 
Cameron 1994). The combined weight of the criticisms directed at the precautionary principle 
has lead to an emerging theoretical shift away from discussions of how a specific 
'precautionary principle' can be applied, towards a description of what a 'precautionary 
approach' to decision making might entail. In this sense, the notion of precaution is moving 
away from being a formulaic decision making rule, towards what might be described as a 
particular process based approach to decision making. 
In a precautionary approach to environmental decision making, the recognition of the 
importance of uncertainty translates into the requirement for a greater degree of humility 
about scientific knowledge in the face of various types of incertitude (Stirling and Gee 2002). 
Associated with this need for a greater degree of humility is the requirement for a more 
reflective approach to science that enables the knowledge to be examined, reflected upon 
and considered in terms of the uncertainties, underlying assumptions and subjective 
judgements involved. This reflective approach to scientific knowledge can be undertaken by 
not only exposing particular knowledge claims to the scrutiny of various other scientific 
disciplines but also to stakeholders and the public more broadly- i.e. engaging in a process 
of 'extended peer review' (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994) or 'negotiated science' (Carr and 
Levidow 1999). Recognising the need for humility and critical reflection on scientific 
knowledge therefore leads to calls for precautionary decision making to involve broad based 
participation. Broad based participation in decision deliberations is certainly justified when 
decisions involve value judgements and widespread uncertainties, but it is also said to be 
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important for encouraging an engagement with the ambiguities and subjective elements 
involved in the framing of risk science (Stirling and Gee 2002). 
In addition to a reflective approach to scientific knowledge and the encouragement of 
broad based participation in decision making processes, precautionary approaches are also 
said to require detailed consideration of the benefits and potential adverse effects associated 
with a range of alternative options (Fairbrother and Bennett 1999; Stirling and Gee 2002). 
This means that a range of policy options for delivering a particular good or service need to 
be considered when a particular activity or technology is judged in a regulatory arena (Stirling 
and Gee 2002). This requirement to consider various alternatives has also led to the 
suggestion that decisions need not necessarily focus on what is the 'best option' but perhaps 
also on how to maintain diversity, resilience, flexibility and adaptability across a range of 
policy options (Klinke and Renn 2002; Stirling 2002, 21). This is said to represent not only a 
way to handle ambiguity (diversification offering a way to accommodate different values and 
interests) but also as a way to approach the challenges associated with ignorance (when 
there are things we don't know we don't know, the best approach might be one focussed on 
flexibility and adaptability, or in other words, 'not putting all our eggs in one basket') (Stirling 
and Gee 2002). 
The final important element in precautionary approaches to environmental decision 
making is stated as being the requirement for ongoing research and dedicated monitoring 
efforts (Klinke and Renn 2002; Stirling and Gee 2002). Through a commitment to ongoing 
research and environmental monitoring the idea is that uncertainty can continue to be 
reduced and our degree of exposure to surprises that may arise due to our ignorance can be 
minimised (Stirling and Gee 2002). 
In summary then, the elements of what represents a precautionary approach to 
environmental decision making are: 
1. A recognition of the limitations of scientific knowledge and a willingness to expose 
scientific claims to a reflective process of 'extended peer review'. 
2. A commitment to reducing uncertainties and minimising surprises generated by ignorance 
through ongoing research and monitoring. 
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3. A transparent handling of ambiguity and indeterminacy through reflection on scientific 
knowledge claims, broad based public participation and the consideration and 
implementation of a range of policy options. 
In general, a precautionary approach can be seen to represent a more inclusive, 
democratic and reflective process for decision making than conventional approaches to risk 
assessment where decision making is viewed as primarily a technical matter and the advice 
of scientific experts consequently granted ultimate authority. By distinguishing between 
'science' and 'precaution' based approaches to decision making, though, I do not mean to 
imply that approaches using scientific information cannot involve the adoption of a position of 
caution or that precautionary approaches do not involve the use of scientific knowledge or 
experts. What I am essentially distinguishing between is the role and degree of influence 
awarded scientific knowledge and expertise. Calling these different approaches to decision 
making 'science' and 'precaution' based may be misleading and therefore we might better 
conceptualise the key differences existing between these approaches as differences 
between a technocratic approach, based primarily on scientific risk analysis (a scienceirisk 
based approach), and a more democratic approach focussed around the deliberative 
negotiation of uncertainties (a precaution/uncertainty based approach). 
Australia's Regulatory Framework for GMO's 
Having described some of the limitations associated with employing a traditional science/risk 
based approach and outlined an emerging alternative approach that can be described as 
precaution/uncertainty based, the question I will now focus on is where Australia's regulatory 
framework for GMOs can be positioned along the spectrum created by these alternative 
approaches to environmental decision making. To assess this, I will consider the four key 
elements of the role awarded science, the degree of public participation, how decisions on 
risk acceptability are made and the requirements for ongoing research and monitoring. 
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The Role of Science in Decision Making 
The Risk Analysis Framework (RAF) used by the OGTR demonstrates that a positivist 
approach to scientific knowledge has been adopted and that this form of knowledge has 
been granted a privileged position in regulatory decision making. In the original version of the 
RAF it is clearly stated that the OGTR views risk assessment as "a scientific process that 
does not take political or other non-scientific aspects of an application to use a GMO into 
account" (Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 2002a, 12). It is also stated that the risk 
assessment will be "objective and scientifically based" (Office of the Gene Technology 
Regulator 2002a, 15). In the revised consultation version of the RAF it is claimed that "the 
process of assessing risks requires a systematic approach that is based on scientific 
evidence" (Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 2004, 11) and that "the requirement to 
focus on objective scientific information is evident in the matters specified by the Act that the 
Regulator must have regard to when considering risks" (Office of the Gene Technology 
Regulator 2004, 14). Through consistent reference to the objectivity of scientific knowledge, 
these quotes indicate that a positivist understanding of this form of knowledge has been 
adopted for Australia's environmental regulation of GMOs. The quotes provided here also 
indicate that through this conceptualisation, science has been granted authority over the 
decision making process. 
The Gene Technology Act 2000 established three advisory committees to the OGTR 
- The Gene Technology Technical Advisory Committee (GTTAC), the Gene Technology 
Ethics Committee (GTEC) and the Gene Technology Community Consultative Committee 
(GTCCC). Interestingly, the Act has legislated that it is only the committee of scientific 
experts (the GTTAC) that must be consulted during the risk assessment process for all 
applications for deliberate environmental release and whose advice must be taken into 
account when making a decision. When preparing a draft Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management Plan (RARMP), the Regulator is required by legislation to seek advice from the 
GTTAC (Commonwealth of Australia 2000, section 50, 33) while there is currently no legal 
requirement that advice from the non-scientific committees be sought. It is also clearly stated 
in the Act that "the Regulator must take into account.. .any advice in relation to the risk 
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assessment provided by the Gene Technology Technical Advisory Committee" 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2000, section 51, 34), while the Regulator is not required by 
legislation to take into account any advice offered by the GTEC or GTCCC in relation to risk 
assessment or risk management. Of course the Regulator may take the advice of these non-
scientific committees into account, but under current legislation there is no requirement that 
this advice be routinely sought on individual applications or taken into account when offered. 
This element of regulatory framing severely limits the influence these non-scientific 
committees have over decision making processes. 
The lack of influence that regulatory framing has granted the non-scientific advisory 
committees has also been clearly demonstrated in practice. Before approval was given for 
the commercial release of GM canola in 2003, the GTCCC chose to advise the Regulator 
that "a state of unreadiness exists concerning the risks to the environment of the commercial 
release of GM canola, so significant that the applications should be declined at this time" 
(Gene Technology Community Consultative Committee 2003). As evidence of the lack of 
influence the GTCCC has on regulatory decision making, this advice was not taken and the 
first GM canola crop received regulatory approval. The lack of influence held by the non-
scientific advisory committees is further evidenced by transkingdom GM crops being 
approved for commercial release before the GTEC has completed its investigation into the 
ethics of transkingdom crosses (Gene Technology Ethics Committee 2003). With the 
Regulator granting approval to GM crops before investigations from the non-scientific 
advisory committees have been completed and not acting on advice given when those 
investigations are complete, it becomes obvious that the non-scientific committees have not 
been granted the same degree of authority over the decision making process as the 
committee of technical experts. This is an element of regulatory framing that further indicates 
the predominance of a technical discourse of risk that awards scientific knowledge primary 
authority over the decision making process. 
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Public Participation in Decision Making 
For Australia's regulation of GMOs, the Act essentially established two primary avenues for 
public participation in the decision making process. These avenues are the non-scientific 
advisory committees and written submissions on individual licence applications. The non-
scientific advisory committees do not however provide an avenue for lay members of the 
public to participate in decision making because to be appointed to these committees you 
need to demonstrate skills or experience in one of the fields listed by the Act. These 
committees are therefore essentially made up of non-scientific experts and this frames 
social, ethical and political issues as matters best represented in the decision making 
process by groups of experts. Additionally, the general public is excluded from this avenue of 
participation because the meetings of these committees are not open to the public, even 
those of the so called 'community consultative committee'. Holding committee meetings in 
public (with commercial in confidence information excluded where necessary) would allow 
lay members of the public to raise concerns relating to socio-political impacts and would also 
arguably encourage deliberation between various worldviews and ideologies. I have, 
however, already discussed how the non-scientific advisory committees currently have 
limited power over decision making processes. This means that even if their meetings were 
held in public, according to the current framework, there would be no guarantee that public 
views and opinions would be granted any real access to decision making processes through 
this avenue. 
The other avenue available for public participation in decision making is that of making 
written submissions on the draft RARMPs developed by the OGTR. As an avenue for public 
participation, this approach has a number of limitations. Firstly, in calling for public submissions 
on RARMPs, the public is being invited to react to an agency developed document. This 
means that the public is generally being invited to participate in the final stages of the decision 
making process, without the ability to contribute to how the problem, objectives or alternatives 
for the decision making process are framed. 
The OGTR also states that comments made in submissions must relate to potential risks 
to human health and safety and the environment, or in other words, to scientifically quantifiable 
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dangers. When the public has raised social, ethical, economic or political concerns in written 
submissions these have simply been deemed to be "OSA" or outside the scope of the 
assessment. The types of issues raised in submissions on the RARMP for the GM cotton 
marketed Bollgard II® but deemed outside the scope of the assessment process include: 
1. The intensive water and chemical usage associated with cotton cropping (Office of the 
Gene Technology Regulator 2002b, submission 3 & 12.), 
2. The impacts of cotton cropping on the unique tropical savannah ecosystems of 
northern Australia (Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 2002b, submission 10 & 
13). 
3. The specific impacts of cotton cropping on river health (Office of the Gene Technology 
Regulator 2002b, submission 10 & 12 & 18) 
4. Issues relating to the potential for contamination of neighbouring farms, affecting their 
ability to claim 'GE Free' status (Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 2002b, 
submission 23) 
5. The lack of ecological research performed in the unique environments of northern 
Australia (Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 2002b, submission 13). 
All of the concerns raised in these submissions relate to the practice of broadacre cotton 
cropping in general and its suitability to the environment of Australia's northern territories, 
issues that were deemed outside the scope of the OGTR's assessment. One submission 
called on the OGTR to address these types of concerns by looking "at the big picture in your 
assessment" (Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 2002b, submission 13), but this 
request too was deemed 'OSA'. 
What these public submissions and the way they have been deemed OSA indicates is 
that while the public has been granted an avenue for participating in decision making, the 
avenue of written submissions has been framed in such a narrow way as to exclude the types 
of concerns that predominate in the community; concerns that go beyond scientifically 
quantifiable dangers associated with the GMO in isolation and relate to characteristics of the 
technology and the context within which it will be applied. The current framework for regulation 
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makes no mention of how these types of characteristics (identified as important by the risk 
perception literature) can be incorporated into the decision making process. 
Assessing the quality of the quoted scientific information through a form of extended peer 
review is also currently being inhibited because the majority of the studies quoted in RARMPs 
are not publicly available. When I requested a copy of some of these studies from the OGTR 
during the course of my research, I was informed that I would have to pay to gain access to 
these documents. The lack of free access to the scientific studies used in assessment 
processes means that there is an inability to engage in critical reflection and an extended peer 
review of the science involved in the risk analysis process and this is severely inhibiting the 
application of precautionary decision making approaches. 
While further research evaluating public participation in the OGTR decision making 
process is certainly desirable, what this discussion indicates is that the current framing and 
operation of regulatory decision making excludes the more holistic and contextual types of 
concerns held by the public, fails to encourage open discussions and deliberations about 
environmental values and inhibits the ability of members of the public to critically reflect on the 
science used in decision making processes. 
Deciding on Risk Acceptability 
While one might reasonably expect public participation to be employed in relation to decisions 
about what constitutes an acceptable level of risk, in practice, the OGTR simply uses current 
industrial practices as the comparative baseline for arriving at decisions about risk 
acceptability. For example, in the final RARMP for the GM cotton marketed as INGARD®, 
section three dealing with the decision on the application states that: 
It is concluded that there are no risks to public health and safety or to the Australian 
environment arising from the proposed release of GM insecticidal INGARD® cotton that 
are additional to those posed by the commercial production of conventional cotton. 
Detailed risk analyses based on the available scientific information are provided in 
Appendices 2-6 in support of this conclusion. Therefore the Regulator has issued licence 
number DIR 02212002 (Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 2002c) 
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The rationale behind using conventional agricultural practices as the baseline for 
acceptable risk comparisons is that the risks posed to the environment by conventional 
agriculture have already been accepted by society and therefore, as long as the levels of risk 
posed by GM crops are no greater, then they too should be considered acceptable. This 
approach to determining risk acceptability ignores the psychometric literature on risk 
perceptions that suggests that people use a range of different factors to decide what an 
acceptable level of risk is, factors such as familiarity, controllability and reversibility. If these 
factors were included in considerations of acceptable levels of risk for GM crops, we may very 
well find that the Australian people are not prepared to accept a lower level of physical risk to 
the environment from GM crops in comparison to the risks from conventional agriculture 
because the risks from GM crops are seen as unfamiliar, uncontrollable, irreversible and have 
the potential to impact on future generations. One could also argue that setting chemically 
intensive conventional agricultural practices as the comparative baseline for risk acceptability is 
setting a particularly low standard by which to judge the environmental impact of GM crops, 
especially given the unfamiliar, uncontrollable and irreversible nature of these impacts. 
It is also worth noting that the use of conventional agriculture as the baseline for 
acceptable risk comparisons for GM crops also inhibits the consideration and implementation 
of a range of policy options. By simply comparing the risks posed to the environment from 
GM crops to those associated with conventional agricultural practices, the full range of 
options available for achieving particular objectives are not considered. For example, when a 
GM crop has been designed to minimise insect damage, the risks to the environment posed 
by this crop are not being compared to alternative means of achieving this objective, such as 
integrated pest management. This approach to determining risk acceptability works to 
maintain the status quo of industrial agricultural practices and limits the ability of the 
regulatory system to implement a range of policy options that could assist with handling the 
problems associated with ignorance and indeterminacy. 
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Monitoring Requirements 
The Gene Technology Act currently contains no provisions for the regular review and renewal 
of licences granted. While the Regulator is granted the power to vary, suspend or cancel a 
licence if new information comes to light (Commonwealth of Australia 2000, section 68 & 71, 
45-46), none of these provisions encourage the OGTR to be proactive in terms of encouraging, 
generating or applying this new information. Without a specific requirement for licence reviews 
and renewals, the question of whether new information regarding risks will be generated, 
comprehensively assessed and applied to licences already granted is left to the discretion of 
the Regulator. Without a legislative requirement for reviewing decisions and risk assessments 
in light of new evidence or experience in the field, the current regulatory framework fails to 
establish the type of ongoing monitoring requirements that were highlighted as an essential 
feature of precautionary decision making. 
While the Act does have provisions for monitoring that grant the OGTR the power to 
audit and monitor licensed dealings, this only applies to the specific conditions applied to a 
licence (Commonwealth of Australia 2000, section 64 (b), 43) - i.e. the Regulator is given the 
power to monitor dealings only in the sense of ensuring that the licence holder is adhering to 
the conditions imposed on the licence. The responsibility for monitoring for unintended 
ecological impacts may, however, be viewed as one that rightfully belongs to the licence holder 
rather than the Regulator and section 65 of the Act does provide that licence holders must 
report any unintended impacts they observe (Commonwealth of Australia 2000, section 65, 
43). Relying on the party that stands to benefit from continued commercial production to report 
on negative impacts is problematic on its own, but it is also worth emphasising that the 
requirement to report any observed unintended adverse impacts is not the same thing as 
requiring ongoing monitoring for these types of impacts. 
The Act clearly states that the OGTR can issue licence conditions for data collection, 
including studies to be conducted (Commonwealth of Australia 2000, section 62 (h), 41). 
Interestingly, this requirement has not occurred in practice. For example, I made a submission 
to the OGTR that raised concerns about the potential non-target impacts of GM cotton. In the 
response I received it was stated that "there are currently few, if any, published data that would 
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enable a rigorous evaluation of potential risks to the structure and function of multi-trophic 
'food-webs' via secondary, tertiary or higher order effects of 8t toxins" (8enyei 2003). Despite 
this acknowledged knowledge deficit, however, the gathering of data to enable a rigorous 
assessment of this risk was not made a condition of the licence. Without requirements for 
ongoing monitoring efforts, particularly in areas where the Regulator has deemed the available 
information insufficient, the ability of the current regulatory system to rapidly respond to risks 
that may emerge from ignorance and uncertainty is severely curtailed. Without requiring 
ongoing research and monitoring and without clear provisions for regular reviews of risk 
assessments and licence decisions capable of incorporating new information and experience, 
the current regulatory framework arguably fails to represent a precautionary approach to 
decision making. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have reviewed some of the social science theory on risk and uncertainty in 
environmental decision making and suggested that the inadequacies of technical discourses 
of risk analysis are seeing an emerging theoretical shift towards approaches that focus on 
the negotiation of uncertainties. The emerging precaution/uncertainty based approaches to 
environmental decision making contrast with more traditional sciencelrisk based approaches 
by employing constructivist rather than realist understandings of science, reimagining the 
role of expertise in environmental decision making, favouring increased public participation 
and negotiation and emphasising the importance of ongoing research and monitoring. 
According to the analysis presented in this paper, Australia's framework for the 
environmental regulation of GMOs appears more representative of the science/risk based 
end of this spectrum of approaches to environmental decision making. 
There are a number of recommendations I could make for how Australia's framework 
for the environmental regulation of GMOs could evolve to overcome some of the described 
limitations associated with adopting a largely technocratic discourse and begin a shift 
towards more precaution based approaches to decision making. Firstly, there could be a 
requirement that the non-scientific advisory committees be consulted in the same way and to 
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the same degree as the committee of technical experts. Secondly, all committee meetings 
could be made open to the public or specific community forums could be established to 
deliberatively discuss criteria for risk acceptability or environmental endpoints for the 
assessment process. Thirdly, all scientific studies quoted in assessments could be made 
freely available to the public and fourthly, regular licence reviews and renewals could be 
made mandatory and enhanced research and monitoring efforts could be requested through 
conditions placed on licences. While none of these recommendations would require major 
institutional changes, they do require the political will to acknowledge the limitations of 
scientific knowledge and the various forms of incertitude affecting environmental decision 
making. Realistically, they also require that a more constructivist approach to the notion of 
risk, science and the environment is embraced by policy communities. 
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